



HROUGHOUT the history of the use of federal injunctions in la-
bor disputes, one doctrinal weapon stands out from the entire ar-
senal used by the courts to promote the ends of "judge-made law"
over the policy of Congress, as expressed in the Clayton Act:, the denial of
the employee-employer relationship. By means of judicial manipulation of
the underlying jurisdictional facts of case after case, the major premise
expressed by Congress-that the Sherman Act2 does not apply to labor,
and that certain recognized activities of organized labor groups were sim-
ply not enjoinable in federal courts-remained for the most part a dead
letter. With the passage of the Norris-La Guardia Act, however, the tide
was finally turned, and the term "labor dispute" was extended to include
any controversy "regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."-, Then with the accession
of the new Court in the late thirties, such "hospitable scope" was given
to the congressional purpose as to "draw the sting of criminality"4 from
any and all activities of labor unions peaceably acting in self-interest,
whether or not such activity resulted in monopoly in the product market
or a setback to the aims of the competitive economy.
In the face of this hospitable and all-inclusive attitude on the part of
the present Court, it is indeed surprising to find the old battle-ax of the
employee-employer relationship once again brought into play. At the same
time that a clean bill of health was granted to the hod carriers,s the car-
penters,6 and their ilk, a decision of the Court which for the most part has
remained unnoticed placed a significant limitation on the scope of the
acts exempting labor by adding a new restriction to the definition of the
* LL.B., Yale Law School. The writer gratefully acknowledges the helpful guidance of Pro-
fessor Walton Hamilton, at whose instance this essay was undertaken.
x38 Stat. 730 (i914), x5 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1941).
2 26 Stat. 209 (i8go), i 5 U.S.C.A. § i (1941).
3 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 'or (1947). See note 71 infra.
4 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
s United States v. International Hod Carriers & Common Laborers' District Council, 313
U.S. 539 (1941).
6 United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).
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employment relationship. The fact that in this instance it was done by a
Court which is sympathetic to the objectives of organized labor and zeal-
ous in giving effect to legislative intent makes the decision all the more
noteworthy.
THE MATRIX OF THE CONTROVERSY
On February 2, 1942, a unanimous Court, speaking through justice
Black, in a suit by a West Coast cannery against a CIO Fishermen's
Union, declared the union, which was the collective bargaining agent for
the fishermen from whom the company obtained its fish, a combination in
restraint of trade and awarded the company treble damages under the
Sherman Act. Reason: The disputants did not stand in the proximate re-
lation of employer and employee. 7 Three years later, on the authority of
this decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in its
mandate to the lower court in a similar suit, denied the claim of the Dram-
atists' Guild (of the Authors' League of America) to exemption from Sher-
man Act liability under Section 2o of the Clayton Act, holding that" ....
the exemption will not apply unless an employer-employee relationship is
the matrix of the controversy."8
Neither decision is noteworthy from the standpoint of the doctrine it
expounds; neither has aroused much comment. The opinions are signifi-
cant not so much for what they say as for what they fail to say. It is not
the ratio decidendi of the court but its inarticulate middle premise which
has in each case led to the watering down of the employment relationship
and the resulting restriction on the coverage of the exempting acts.9
In neither opinion does the court tell us in any concrete, factual terms
just what characterizes this all-important employment relationship. In
7 Columbia River Packers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
8 Ring v. Spina, 148 F. 2d 647, 651 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
9 It must be pointed out in limine that the nature of the employment relationship is only
one facet of the problem of identifying the "labor dispute" within the statutory meaning of the
term. Perhaps equally important is the nature of the demands made-do they amount to bona
fide collective bargaining? In the cases concerning dramatists and fishermen, notes 7 and 8
supra, the courts held the nature of the relationship to be the crucial factor; if the employee
relationship can be demonstrated, then the nature of the demands will concededly amount to
collective bargaining. On the other band, in American Medical Association v. United States,
317 U.S. 519 (1943), the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the employee-em-
ployer relationship lay at the matrix of the controversy because of the very nature of the con-
troversy itself. The American Medical Association physicians were not interested in seeking
employment with Group Health; they were not interested in the terms of conditions of Group
Health doctors' employment, except to make sure that there was no Group Health to employ
them; and above all, by their own emphatic assertion, they were not interested in collective
bargaining. ".... The petitioners represented physicians who desired that they and all others
should practice independently on a fee for service basis, where whatever arrangement for pay-
ment each had was a matter that lay between him and his patient in each individual case of
service of treatment." Ibid., at 536.
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the former, we are simply presented with a conclusion that "the dispute
here, relating solely to the sale of fish, does not place in controversy the
wages or hours or other terms and condition -of employment of these em-
ployees."' ° As to the status of the playwrights, the court would have us
believe that "the minimum price and royalties provided by the Basic
Agreement, unlike minimum wages in a collective bargaining agreement,
are not remuneration for continued services, but are the terms at which
a finished product or certain rights therein may be sold.""
But how may the two genres be distinguished? One learns in an early
lesson in economics that the most lowly employee is truly a seller--his
wages are in fact nothing but the price received for the sale of his services.
When the playwright "sells" his manuscript, he is being paid for much
more than the commodity value of the paper on which it is written. What
his sale price represents is actually the market value of his services as an
artist-the labor that has gone into the thing to make it command so dear
a price. Which is the "wage" and which is the "sale"? How are we to know
"the employee-employer relationship" when we see it?
THE INFINITE AND SUBTLE VARIATIONS
Myriad forms of service relationship, with infinite and subtle variations in the terms
of employment, blanket the nation's economy.-
The question is by no means a new one. "Few problems in the law have
yielded greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases
arising in the borderland between what is dearly an employee-employer
relationship and what is dearly one of independent entrepreneurial deal-
ing."' 3 In viewing the auto assembly line mechanic and Henry Ford, no
one would doubt for a moment that there is an employment relationship.
But while it may be said that the mass production type of industrial struc-
ture has become the predominant pattern in this country in terms of the
number of people so employed and in terms of popular normative think-
ing, still it is grossly inaccurate to regard this particular form as typical
in any generic sense. Such generalization excludes from consideration the
great variety of structure and practice which characterizes our present
economy, especially among the smaller business and industrial units. "An
industry, like an individual, is a part of all that it has met; it has a char-
acter, a structure, a system of habits of its own. Its pattern is out of ac-
10 Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton, 3,5 U.S. 143, 147 (1942) (italics added).
Note the Court's characterization of these fishermen as "employees" in the same sentence
which excludes them from the scope of the employee-employer relationship.
11 Ring v. Spina, 148 F. 2d 647, 652 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
13 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 11i, 126 (I944).
'3 Ibid., at 121.
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cord with a normative design; its activities conform very imperfectly with
a chartered course of industrial events.' 4 To talk about "the" employ-
ment relationship is to assume a standardization which simply does not
exist.
A glance into the reported cases in which the problem of employee-or-
entrepreneur has been presented bears eloquent testimony to the multi-
farious guises into which this relationship has been cast-and to the utter
chaos which has resulted from the judicial attempt to find a single legal
norm in terms of which they could all be analyzed. The term "employee"
has been extended by the courts to cover a great variety of trade and em-
ployment patterns. Holders of such borderline jobs as those of the taxi
driver, s the individual tailor, needleworker, or homeworker,'6 the window
cleaner,"' the newsboy,' 8 the "coal hustler,"' 9 the "gypsy chaser,'0 the
red-cap porter 2 X the backwoods lumberman," the free-lance artist and
writer '2 the insurance canvasser 2 4 the vendor or jobber of various wares,
including milk, baked goods, laundry and soda pop25 -all of whom are in
some respects analogous to the small businessman or entrepreneur-have
at one time or another been allowed the rights, privileges, duties, and ex-
'4 Hamilton and others, Price and Price Policies 4 (1938).
ISTaxi-Cab Drivers Local Union No. 899 v. Yellow Cab Operating Co., 123 F. 2d 262(C.C.A. ioth, Y941).
A Walling v. Twyeffort, 65 F. Supp. 920 (N.Y., 1946) (tailors); Walling v. American Needle-
crafts, 139 F. 2d 6o (C.C.A. 6th, 943) (needleworkers); United States v. Vogue, 145 F. 2d 6og
(C.C.A. 4 th, 1944) (seamstresses); Fleming v. Demeritt Co., 56 F. Supp. 376 (Vt., 1944) (home-
workers).
7 Brayer v. Charton, 37 N.Y.S. 2d 326 (1942); Suchodolski v. American Federation of La-
bor, International Building Service Employees Union, 127 N.J. Eq. 511 (i94o).
9 -NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. iI (i944); In the Matter of Seattle Post-
Intelligencer Department of Hearst Publications, 9 N.L.R.B. X262, 1270-75 (1938); In the
Matter of the Post Standard Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 226 (i94I).
' Grace v. Magruder, x48 F. 2d 679 (App. D.C., 194s).
20 United States v. Local 807 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Sta-
blemen and Helpers of America, 315 U.S. 521 ('942).
"Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386 (1942); Southern Ry. v. Black,
127 F. 2d 280 (C.C.A. 4th, 1942).
" In the Matter of the Connor Lumber and Land Co. and International Woodworkers of
America, Local No. 125, i N.L.R.B. 776, 786-87 (i939).
"3 In the Matter of KMOX Broadcasting Station and the St. Louis Local, American Fed-
eration of Radio Artists, io N.L.R.B. 479 (1938) (radio artists); In the Matter of Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. and Screen Publicists Guild, 32 N.L.R.B. 717 (1941) (motion picture
publidty writers).
24 La Lone v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 947 (Wash., i944).
2S Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S.
9i (i94o) (milk); Bernstein v. Madison Baking Co., i86 N.Y. Misc. 474, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 8ii
(1942) (baked goods); People v. Gassman, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E. 2d 705 (1946) (laundry);
Singer v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 27T App. Div. 8oi, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1946) (soda pop).
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emptions of employees where it was found that within the specific indus-
trial context the conditions under which they worked more closely re-
sembled those of the employee status.26 By what token then are such sim-
ilarly ambivalent artisans as the fishermen and the playwright excluded
from the scope of the employment relation?
Justice Black, in the previous term, had stated that a case involving a
CIO union of milk vendors in Chicago who purchased their milk from the
dairies and resold to the consumer was a bona fide labor dispute.27 The re-
lation between the dairies and the union members, just as between the
canners and the fishermen, was, on paper at least, that of buyer and seller.
The president of the company himself was in a quandary as to how to label
them: "... . They own their own trucks and pay their own expenses and
they buy milk at a certain price at our dairy. In one way they are em-
ployees and in another way we do not pay wages. ' '2S Yet the Court was
willing to pierce the contractual veil to find that in substance their situa-
tion was like that of employees. The fact that the collective agreement in
this case, as in the Hinton case, was couched in terms of "sale" rather than
in the language of "wages" was not reconciled in the latter opinion except
by invoking the touchstone: that in the former "the employee-employer
relationship was at the matrix of the controversy" and in the latter it was
not-which merely begs the question.
Turning to the opinion of the district court for some light as to what
characterizes the relationship, we find another suggestion: The defendants
are not "employees" but rather they are "producers, just as cattlemen,
grainmen, poultry raisers, or orchardists are producers. ' '29 True enough,
this serves to distinguish the Milk Drivers' case, for peddlers are distrib-
utors and not producers or suppliers. It is also a convenient point of com-
parison for the dramatists, for their play is the product of their own in-
genuity and workmanship alone, just as the fisherman's catch is the orig-
inal product of his exclusive labor. But will this distinction, any more than
the preceding one of sale or wage, serve to encompass all the various em-
ployment patterns "that blanket the nation's economy"?
26 The cases set forth above were decided under a variety of social legislation, certainly not
entirely under the anti-trust laws. They are not cited as controlling authority for the principal
cases; they are used as persuasive of the great variety of callings which, when realistically ex-
amined within their respective industrial contexts, have been held by courts to be within the
scope of the so-called employee-employer relationship. See also materials collected in 322 U.S.
ixi, at 127 n. 26 (I944).
-7 Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S.
91 (194o)
29 Ibid., at 98 n. ii.
29 Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 974 (Ore., I939).
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The cases of the coal miner 3° and the lumberman 3l come to mind. They,
like the fisherman or the farmer, are producers, engaged in the taking and
distribution of an important natural resource, "the common bounty of all
men."32 In a recent case in the Federal District Court for Kentucky a
mine operator sought to evade his responsibilities as an employer by means
of contractual arrangements whereby each of his subordinates was to
operate a portion of the mine independently, employing his own help,
furnishing his own equipment, and being paid not by the hour on a salary
basis, but by means of the "sale" of his coal to the owner at a fixed rate
per ton. But here again, the court, looking beyond the form of the rela-
tionship, held: "Although the defendants in this case undertook to avoid
the impact of the Fair Labor Standards Act by adopting the scheme of
letting their employees become what under some circumstances might be
regarded as an independent contractor relationship, the economic realities
of the situation require the conclusion that not only the subordinate per-
sonnel but also the alleged independent contractors themselves are em-
ployees ..... -33
Nor can we say, as some suggest, that the element of risk-bearing is the
determining factor; or, as others would put it, that the determining factor
is ownership of the means of production. Window cleaners certainly bear
the risks of their enterprise, and piece workers in an assortment of trades
own their own equipment and assume the losses of damage and spoilage
to their product. An enlightening opinion handed down in I944 by the
present Secretary of Labor, sitting in his capacity as District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, shows the ineffectiveness of these criteria
as guideposts for identifying the presumed employee-employer relation-
ship. The case involved the status of an insurance salesman under the Old
Age and Survivor's Insurance Act. He had been originally employed by
the Barrett Insurance Co., had gone into business for himself, and failing
in that, had returned to Barrett under an arrangement whereby he could
become a partner upon his successful solicitation of a certain amount of
new business. The Social Security Board, relying on the factors of risk-
bearing and ownership of means of performance, had denied the claim of
his representative on the grounds that he was not an employee of Barrett
3o Walling v. Woodbine Coal Co., 64 F. Supp. 82 (My., I945). See also NLRB v. Blount,
131 F. 2d 585 (C.C.A. 8th, 1942), where the owner of a Barite mine who permitted persons to
mine the ore in return for a royalty was held to be an employer and the miners his employees.
31 In the Matter of the Connor Lumber and Land Co. and International Woodworkers of
America, Local No. 125, 11 N.L.R.B. 776 (1939).
,2 Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 976 (Ore., 1939).
'3 Walling v. Woodbine Coal Co., 64 F. Supp. 82, 85 (Ky., 1945).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Co. Judge Schwellenbach in his reversal, admonishing the referee for his
excessive reliance on traditional doctrine and his failure to give heed to
the particular trade practices of the insurance business, summed up as
follows:
"I can readily understand how anyone inexperienced in business prac-
tices would construe this to mean that at all times La Lone maintained a
proprietary interest in his business and was working for himself. Actually
all he had was the right to recapture these accounts .... [and quoting
from judge Parker]34 what is needed is not the bookish approach of the
scientist but the common sense approach of a court accustomed to deal
with all sorts of human relationships. ' 35
The prize example of "the bookish approach of the scientist" is the
common-law independent contractor test, which has been the most popu-
lar criterion of all with those who postulate "the" employment relation-
ship. This, of all the aforementioned alternatives, is the criterion which
most likely underlay the decision excluding the fishermen from the em-
ployee status.36 It is claimed that since Congress has failed explicitly to de-
fine the term "employee," or the "employee-employer relationship," the
old common-law use of the term was intended: that whether or not a given
individual is an employee or an independent contractor depends upon
whether or not the purported employer exercises control over the means
of performance as well as the end result to be achieved. While this is more
frequently than not espoused as the governing rule of statutory construc-
tion, it never has been satisfactorily explained why a criterion borrowed
from the law of agency and designed to determine tort liability should be
relevant or reliable as a yardstick for measuring eligibility for the "em-
ployee team" in the "industrial combat."37 Not only have its theoretical
merits been challenged, both as a measure of tort liability3 and, a fortiori,
34 Parker, Recurrence to Fundamentals, 30 A.B.A.J. 620, 623 (1944).
3 La Lone v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 947 (Wash., 1944).
36 Compare the language used by the lower court to characterize the relationship: "Said
fishermen are directly employed by no one but are producers and independent contractors ....
who own or lease the boats they operate, own the nets and other gear, but each of these operates
his business according to his own desires, uncontrolled by the plaintiff." District Court Finding
of Fact VII, Record on Appeal, Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, Inc. v. Hinton, p. 6o.
37 ,.... Both the common law of a State and a statute of the United States [the Clayton
Act] declare the right of industrial combatants to push their struggle to the limits of the justi-
fication of self-interest." Brandeis, J.; dissenting in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443, 488 (1921).
38 Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 5o (1935);
Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Assumption of Risk, 38 Yale LJ. 584, 720 (1929); Judicial
Restrictions on Peaceful Picketing by "Non-Labor" Groups, 51 Yale L.J. 1039 (1942).
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as a measure of the broader employment relationship, 39 but pragmatically
it can be shown that, like the other criteria which have been advanced, it
fails to comprehend the distinctive employment patterns in many in-
dustries.4°
In the final analysis, there is no universal formula by which the em-
ployee may be distinguished from the entrepreneur. The criteria of the
"sale" as opposed to the "wage," the producer as opposed to the distrib-
utor, the casual as opposed to the regular course of dealing, risk-bearing
and ownership, or even the hallowed control test of the common law, all
enter into the determination, but in the last analysis it is the industry,
not the norm, which must be decisive. As this brief survey has indicated,
for every norm suggested as characterizing the quintessence of the em-
ployment relationship, there are always some industrial situations-situa-
tions which by judicial admission embody the employment relationship-
which simply do not fit into the neat abstraction.
It is in the nature of the human material with which we are dealing that
it defies stereotype and cannot be pigeonholed into the preconceived
category. Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the nature of the judicial
process which requires such conceptual treatment. Judge Learned Hand
many years ago pointed the way for resolving issues of this sort with the
suggestion that "this is one of those classes of cases where it is safer to
prick out the contour of the rule empirically by successive instances than
to attempt definitive generalization."' 4' And in April I944, three years
after the Hinton case was handed down, the Supreme Court declared that
"economic relationships cannot be fitted neatly into the containers desig-
nated 'employer' and 'employee' which an earlier law had shaped for dif-
ferent purposes."42
THE CONTOUR OF THE RULE
That term [employee] .... must be understood with reference to the purpose of
the Act and the facts involved in the economic relationship. Where all the conditions
of the relation require protection, protection ought to be given.43
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. was a case arising under the Wagner
Act44 which presented the same basic issue as that under consideration in
the Hinton case and in Ring v. Spina: Were the "newsboys" whom Local
39 Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 188 (i9.39).
40 See discussion of the Hearst and Gassman cases below, p. 645 et seq.
41 In re All Star Feature Corp., 231 Fed. 251, 252 (D.C. N.Y., 1916).
42 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. iii, 128 (1944).
43 Ibid., at 129.
44 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i51 ('947).
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75 sought to represent employees with the right to self-organization under
the statute, or were they independent businessmen as was claimed by the
publishers? The circuit court below found as a matter of law that the em-
ployee relationship did not exist and the case went up to the Supreme
Court on that issue. In an 8-i opinion, the Court, speaking through
Justice Rutledge, made an unequivocal departure from the doctrinal
treatment of prior cases and upheld the NLRB's finding that the "news-
boys" came under the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act.
To begin with, the Court disposed of the circuit court's denial of the
employee-employer relationship because the newsboys' control over the
physical means of performance and their assumption of certain risks of
the enterprise predestined them for the "independent contractor contain-
er." "The mischief at which the Act is aimed," it said, "and the remedies
it offers are not confined exclusively to 'employees' within the traditional
legal distinctions separating them from 'independent contractors.' ,,4S But
it did not stop at merely rejecting the traditional categories. It went on to
enunciate a new approach to statutory interpretation on questions of this
sort-an approach which required consideration of i) the basic economic
facts of the relationship within its particular industrial background, in the
light of 2) the ends sought to be accomplished by the legislature. In the
first respect, it analyzed the practices of the trade and the pattern of the
news-hawking business and found that both the price at which the news-
boys buy their papers and the price at which they sell to the public are
fixed by the publishers; that the spots at which they operate are likewise
assigned to them by the publishers; that the allocation of spots is often
used as a disciplinary measure; and that as a matter of economic fact the
newsboy's bargaining power as an individual was practically nonexistent.
As to the second factor, the condition which the legislature sought to rem-
edy was found to be "inequality of bargaining power in controversies over
wages, hours, and working conditions" which, the Cburt said, may as
well characterize independent contractors as employees. Viewing the two
factors in juxtaposition, it concluded:
... The particular workers in these cases are subject, as a matter of
economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate, and the
remedies it affords are appropriate for preventing them or curing their
harmful effects .... In short, when the particular situation of employ-
ment combines these characteristics so that the economic facts of the re-
lationship make it more nearly one of employment than of independent
business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished by
4s NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. iii, 126 (1944).
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the legislation, those characteristics may outweigh technical legal classi-
fication for purposes unrelated to the statute's objectives and bring the re-
lation within its protection."4
Since Justice Rutledge's opinion was handed down, this "mischief-
remedy test,147 which it suggests, has been widely followed by the lower
courts not only in NLRB cases, but for purposes of determining status
under other forms of social legislation as well.45 Recently the Supreme
Court itself extended it to apply to cases involving coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act49 and the Federal Social Security Act s" and even
relied on it to some extent in a District of Columbia Workmen's Com-
pensation Appeal.5 '
Hence it does not appear too daring to suggest that the Hearst case
method be adopted for purposes of determining the scope of the employ-
ment relationship under the labor exemption to the anti-trust laws and un-
der the anti-injunction laws, especially in view of the similarity in underly-
ing policy between the latter and the Wagner Act, out of which the Hearst
case arose. As a matter of fact, the New York Court of Appeals has already
applied the mischief-remedy approach to a case under the New York State
anti-trust laws in which the problem was strikingly parallel to that of the
Hinton and Spina cases.?
46 Ibid., at 127.
47 The "mischief-remedy test" was the label given to the doctrine of the Hearst case by
an author who derived the term from what he regarded as the chief determinants of the doc-
trine: "the mischief at which the act is aimed" and "the remedies it affords." Labor Law: Scope
of the Term "Employee," 32 Calif. L. Rev. 289 (i944). The term willbe used herein as a short-
hand reference to the Hearst doctrine.
48 "In many cases, most of which have been decided since National Labor Relations Board
v. Hearst Publications, Inc., courts have held that the traditional common law tests or con-
cepts of an employer-employee relationship .... are not controlling in dealing with social
legislation, and that under such legislation the area between employee and entrepreneurial en-
terprise is to be surveyed and determined in practical industrial and economic perspective and
with regard for the special remedial purpose of the legislation." Walling v. McKay, 70 F. Supp.
16o, 170 (Neb., 1946).
49 "The Fair Labor Standards Act is a part of the social legislation of the 193o's of the same
general character as the National Labor Relations Act .... and the Social Security Act .....
Decisions that define the coverage of the employer-employee relationship under the Labor and
Social Security acts are persuasive in the consideration of a similar coverage under the Fair
Labor Standards Act." Rutherford Food Corporation v. McComb, 67 S. Ct. 1473 (1947).
so "Application of the social security legislation should follow the same rule that we applied
to the National Labor Relations Act in the Hearst case." United States v. Silk, 67 S. Ct. 1463,
1468 (I947).
s, Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 67 S. Ct. 8o (1947).
""In People v. Gassman, 295 N.Y. 254, 66 N.E. 2d 705 (946), the group under indictment
for restraining trade was a union of laundry jobbers who had most of the attributes of common-
law independent contractors. Their job was to pick up and mark the laundry, keep the ac-
counts, and collect the money; their compensation was measured, not by a fixed salary, but by
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It is submitted that were the Hinton and Spina cases to be reconsidered
in the light of the Hearst case, an entirely different result would be reached.
For purposes of testing this hypothesis, the abuses which Congress sought
to remedy in the interlacing statutes involved in Columbia River Packers v.
Hinton and in Ring v. Spina will be first considered. A clinical study of the
economic position of the individuals claiming the protection of the stat-
utes in these cases-the fishermen and the dramatists-follows. Finally an
evaluation is attempted as to whether, as a matter of economic fact, these
groups are subject to "the mischief at which the act is aimed" and in need
of the remedies it provides.
THE MISCHIEF AT WHICH THE ACT IS AIMED
The Sherman Act,53 like so many doctrines of its kind, has undergone
considerable evolution in the course of its operation over the last half-
century.5 4 In its inception, it constituted little more than a restatement
of the common law of monopolies and restraints of trade.ss In recent years,
partly due to legislative amendments, 56 partly to a more vigorous en-
forcement policy on the part of the administration, sT and partly to changes
on the Supreme Court bench, it has taken a new lease on life as an ag-
the amount collected from the customer less the wholesale price of the laundry; they operated
their businesses on their own time and as they saw fit. Yet the court, on closer examination of
the industrial framework in which they operated, found that the function they were performing
was practically identical to that formerly carried on by company-employed truck drivers who
had been discharged years ago for tax and social security reasons. Viewing this industrial pic-
ture in terms of the exempting acts, after the methods of the Hearst case, the New York Court
of Appeals concluded:
"True they have some of the marks or qualities of independent contractors, such as a meas-
ure of independence and some small investment of capital. But in common speech and common
sense, they are still 'workingmen' just as are window cleaners or fumacemen who go from house
to house and are not employees of anyone. Wefind no controlling definitions of 'labor union' or
'workingmeiz' but we are dealing not with niceties of language but with a broad policy, strongly ex-
pressed of exempting workers from the antimonopoly statutes." Ibid., at 26o (italics added).
The case may not be distinguished on grounds of the statutes involved, for the New
York Antitrust Act and the New York labor exemption are modeled almost word for word after
the federal laws. For example, compare the following with the provision of the Clayton Act set
forth in note 71 infra:
"The labor of human beings shall not be deemed or held to be a commodity or article of com-
merce as such terms are used in this section, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed to
prohibit or restrict the right of workingmen to combine in unions, organizations and associa-
tions not organized for the purpose of profit." N.Y. General Business Law (McKinney, 194)
c. 19, § 340 (3)-
s3 26 Stat. 209 (i89o), as amended, is U.S.C.A. § 1 (1941).
54 Hamilton and Till, Antitrust in Action (U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee,
Monograph 16, 194o); Handier, Construction and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws (U.S.
Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph 38, 1941).
ss Hamilton, Common Right, Due Process, and Antitrust, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 24
(1940).
s6 Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 (1941); Robinson-Patman Act, 38
Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 13 (194I).
s' Arnold, Antitrust Law Enforcement, Past and Future, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5 (194o).
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gressive economic instrument to control the tendency toward concentra-
tion of economic powers8 and to secure competitive operation of our pri-
vate enterprise system.5 9
Today it is generally considered unlikely that the original Sherman Act
was ever intended to apply to labor groups.6" "It was enacted in an era
of 'trusts' and of 'combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and
directed to control of the market... the monopolistic tendency of which
had become a matter of public concern."',, In the middle or transition pe-
riod, under the rule of reason, certain forms of concerted action by labor
groups were held to be unreasonable restraints, 6 2 but eventually the fa-
mous Brandeis dissent in the Bedford Stone case63 was written into the law
of the majority.64 More recently, under the "new Sherman Act," 65 while
there had been concerted efforts to subject "big labor" to the anti-trust
laws6 when the issue reached the Supreme Court in the Apex case it was
held that, the labor exemption aside, the affirmative provisions of the
Sherman Act were aimed not at concerted actions on the part of labor
which may hinder the competitive position of the employer, but only at
such restraints as tend to affect the product market and deprive the con-
sumer of the advantages of competition. The Court took the opportunity
to reaffirm that the objective of the Sherman Act was "... the prevention
of restraints to free competition in business and commercial transactions
which tended to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the
s5 Economic Concentration and World War II, S. Doc. 2o6, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946).
s9 Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
s67 (1947).
60 Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act 3-51 (1930).
61 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 3io U.S. 469, 492 (1940).
62 United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 Fed. 994 (D.C.
La., 1893), 57 Fed. 85 (C.C.A. 5th, 1893); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
63 "The Sherman Law was held in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417, to permit capitalists to combine in a single corporation So per cent of the steel industry
of the United States dominating the trade through its vast resources. The Sherman Law was
held in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, to permit capitalists to
combine in another corporation practically the whole shoe machinery industry of the coun-
try ..... It would, indeed, be strange if Congress had by the same Act willed to deny to mem-
bers of a small craft of workingmen the right to cooperate in simply refraining from work, when
that course was the only means of self-protection against a combination of militant and power-
ful employers. I cannot believe that Congress did so." Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen
Stone Cutters' Ass'n of North America, 274 U.S. 37, 65 (1927).
64 Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co.,
303 U.S. 323 (x938); see note 71 infra.
6s Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
567 (1947).
6For an analysis and critique of this policy, see Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws,
34 Ill. L. Rev. 769 (1940).
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market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and serv-
ices.. "67
On the other hand, we find the exempting Acts"5 encouraging the com-
bination of labor units. 69 We may regard that purpose in the broader
sense as complementary to and consistent with the basic values of the
anti-trust laws in that both are seeking to equalize the relative bar-
gaining positions of the component elements of our democratic-capi-
talist economy so as to preserve the competitive conditions upon which
its successful functioning depends. Or, we may view it within the more spe-
cific frame of reference of the economic theorist, as antithetical to the
purposes of the Sherman Act in that it introduces a substantial restriction
upon the operation of the free market.7° But whichever the rationale, the
congressional intent-as twice restated to correct the erosion of judicial
legislation to the contrary- 7' remains72 that labor groups, acting inde-
67 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,493 (1940).
68 Clayton Act § 6,38 Stat. 731 (1914), x5 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1941); Norris-La Guardia Act § i,
47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1or (1947).
69 The legislative history of the exempting acts has been the subject of much research and
comment and will not be elaborated herein; see Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930);
Boudin, Organized Labor and the Clayton Act, 29 Va. L. Rev. 272, 395 (1942); Pierce, Labor
and the Antitrust Laws, i8 So. Calif. L. Rev. 17, (1945).
70 The Basis of the Labor Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 54 Yale L.J. 853 (1945).
71 " .... The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shallbe construed to forbidthe existence and operation of labor
.... organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help ..... " Clayton Act § 6, 38
Stat. 731 (i914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1941). Section 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52
(1927) denies the courts power to issue injunctions in labor disputes except in special circum-
stances and provides that "No such .... injunction shall prohibit any person or persons,
whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to
perform any work.... or from .... persuading others by peaceful means to do so .....
In a succession of cases-Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (I92r); Ameri-
can Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (192X); down through
Bedford Cut Stone Company v. journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n of North America, 274
U.S. 37 (I927)-the Supreme Court managed to denature the effect of the above provisions
by the dual weapon of limiting the legitimate objectives of union action and by restricting the
scope of the employment relationship for purposes of denying the existence of a labor dispute.
See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930).
In response to popular indignation with this "judge-made law," Congress passed the Norris-
La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1oi (1947). The policy expressed in Sections
6 and 2o of the Clayton Act was reasserted, and an attempt was made to eliminate the loop-
holes by means of which the courts had escaped enforcing its provisions. One of the chief meas-
ures adopted to counteract the effects of judicial erosion was the broadening of the scope of the
term "labor dispute." Under Section r3 (c), 47 Stat. 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 113 (c) (1947),
"the term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Italics
added.
72 Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o (j) (1947)
, 
while subjecting certain
labor abuses to injunction, does nothing to alter the immunity from the antitrust laws which
labor unions enjoy.
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pendently and in their own self-interest, shall not be subject to the anti-
trust laws.7 3 Just as the Wagner Act74 is aimed at employer interference
with labor's exercise of its right to self-organization, so the exempting Acts
were directed at judicial interference with this same right. In both cases
labor derives the right to organize and combine from its inferior bargain-
ing position, and in both cases the right is protected in order to equalize
the power of the two combatants in the industrial corffict.7 s
Our problem now is to determine under which of these major congres-
sional policies the subject individuals fall-that enjoining the combination
of capital and business units or that encouraging the combination of labor
groups with inferior bargaining power? We have seen that there is no rule
of thumb that can be applied. So let us continue in our application of the
mischief-remedy approach and proceed to an examination of the economic
milieus of the fishermen and the dramatists, letting the facts speak for
themselves.
THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC FACTS: TWO CLINICAL STUDIES
In the long run, the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to
him, but the necessity is not so immediate ..... Masters are always and everywhere
in a sort of tacit, but constant uniform combination not to raise the wages of labour
above their actual rate.A
A. THE COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON FISHERIMEN
The fishing industry on the West Coast presents in microcosm an illus-
tration of the heterogeneity of trade and employment practices which
73 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
,4 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1947).
7s Even as conservative a judge as Chief Justice Taft openly recognized this as the policy
behind the Clayton Act: "Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when in-
stituted for mutual help and lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects ..... They were or-
ganized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer. He was dependent on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and his family.
If the employer refused to pay him the wages he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to
leave the employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was essential to give la-
borers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer." American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921).
For a statement of the motivating policy behind the Norris-La Guardia Act, see Report of
the Senate Committee headed by Senator Norris: "It is obvious that existing conditions under
which large employers of labor possess unprecedented power to dictate contracts and condi-
tions of employment have been developed through governmental grants of authority to form
-corporations and organizations of corporations whereby thousands of owners of capital are able
to combine hundreds of millions of dollars of capital and thus control and sometimes substan-
tially to monopolize opportunities for employment. Such a power unrestrained by the organiza-
tion of labor would permit employers arbitrarily to fix wages and conditions of employment un-
der which millions of men and women would find their only opportunity to earn a living. A sin-
gle laborer standing alone and confronted with such far-reaching and overwhelming concentra-
tion of employer power and compelled to labor for the support of himself and his family, is ab-
solutely helpless to negotate or exert any influence over the fixing of his wages or conditions of
his labor." S. Rep. 63, 7 2d Cong. ist Sess., at 9 (1932).
6 1 Smith, Wealth of Nations 58 (Everyman's ed., i9io).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
characterize the American industrial scene in general. Around each species,
and in each locality, there has grown up a distinctive group of practices
and customs of trade and of production. In the case of salmon fishing on
the inland rivers, the fishing is done primarily with gill nets drifting with
the current or tide as the salmon head upstream to spawn.77 The spawning
begins in June in the headwaters and continues until November, when the
rivers begin to freeze over in parts. Due to the similarity in habits of sal-
mon and shad and the similar techniques required in their capture, the
fishermen on the Oregon rivers usually start the season in April, when the
shad appear on the rivers, and continue through the end of the shad season
in June into the salmon catch. The fishing in both instances is usually done
overnight in small boats. Very little gear is required. It is done compara-
tively close to the canneries so that long hauls are not necessary. In some
cases a helper is employed who is paid -only for the particular catches in
which he is engaged. In many instances only one man will gather the fish
from the net as it is pulled over the stern of the boat. Small boats are used,
and the repairs to and purchase of the nets may amount to more than the
repair and upkeep of the boats. Into this general pattern fall the members
of the Pacific Coast Fishermens' Union involved in the Hinton case.
It is enlightening to contrast with inland-river fishing the deep-sea
salmon fishing such as that which supplies the Seattle market. 78 There the
trollers go out for several weeks at a time on large vessels, each of which
has an owner, a captain, and crew.79 Whereas the entire product of the
deep-sea troller is purchased by many small peddlers, jobbers, or fresh-
fish dealers of one sort or another for consumption by the housewife the
same day, the situation in river fishing is entirely different. As appeared in
the record of the Hinton case, almost the entire catch of the inland-river
fishermen is taken by the packers for canning purposes. The fishermen
77 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Distribution Methods and Costs, Part IX,
Cost of Production and Distribution of Fish on the Pacific Coast 53-57 (1946).
78 Ibid., at 57.
79 The deep-,ea fishermen have their own organizations such as the Fishermen's Coopera-
tive Ass'n, Inc. of Seattle, which makes no claim to labor-union status and the members of
which freely acknowledge that they are in business for themselves and are employees of no one.
Before the war the association operated an exchange through which all fish was marketed. In
1941 the Department of Justice secured an indictment against the Seattle Fish Exchange for
restraints which had grown up in the sale of halibut. In x942 a consent decree was entered, and
shortly thereafter the OPA sounded the final death knell of this organization. Ibid., at 35. It
must also be noted at this point that on May 8th, 1947, the anti-trust division secured a convic-
tion of Local 36 of the CIO Fishermen and Allied Workers Union for restraints in the sale of
fresh fish at the Los Angeles market. N.Y. Times p. 12, col. 3 (May 9, 1947). The distinction
must be made between the situations presented by the above two cases involving the sale by
deep-sea fishermen to the fresh-fish dealers, jobbers, and peddlers, and that of the gill-net river
fishermen who sell to the canners and packers.
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generally own the nets and some own the boats. Those who do not own
their own boats may do one of two things: they may hire themselves out
as helpers on a "lay" basis to a boat-owning colleague, in which case the
general custom is that their compensation is measured by one-third the
amount of the net catch.
But for those who do not have their own vessels and are unwilling or
unable to obtain work on a lay basis, the companies themselves maintain
a fleet of fishing boats which are available to fishermen. In the Hinton
case, the district court found that at least five of the defendants "are using
powered boats heretofore belonging to the plaintiff, sold to them by the
plaintiff under the agreement that said fishermen will sell and deliver their
fish caught in said areas to the plaintiff until their purchase price is
paid.' 'S° Under this sort of arrangement, not only is the individual fish-
erman obligated to turn over his catch regularly to the canner until the
price is paid but the canner retains a chattel mortgage on the boat itself,
so that in case of default by the fishermen foreclosure and repossession by
the canner is a certain consequence. Under these circumstances, the bar-
gaining power of the "share-fishing" fishermen as to the "price" which his
catch is worth is practically nil unless he combines with others for con-
certed action.
Of the three types of status among union members-the fisherman -who
works out of his own boat, the man who works as another's helper on a
lay basis, and the one who works out of a company-owned boat on a share-
fishing basis-while the third is the clearest case, all three appear upon
analysis of the basic industrial conditions to be subject to the evils of in-
ferior bargaining power which the exempting Acts were designed to cure.
The bargaining position of all the river fishermen is similar in two re-
spects: the nature of their product and the nature of their market.
Salmon is a highly perishable product. Unless it is sold on the day it is
landed it spoils before it can be processed. If the unorganized fishermen
were left to discuss terms and conditions of sale while the salmon were
lying on the wharves, they would be powerless to hold out and would be
compelled to accept anything the canners offered.8' This is so not only be-
cause of the threat of spoilage and consequent inability to get any price at
all, but also by virtue of a statutory penalty imposed under the Oregon
conservation laws for the wasting of food fish. 82 Bargaining power has been
1o U.S.D.C. for District of Oregon, Findings of Fact in Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, Inc.
v. Hinton, Finding XIV, Record on Appeal, at 65 (March Term, 1939).
s Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Distribution Methods and Costs, Part IX,
Cost of Production and Distribution of Fish on the Pacific Coast 55 (1946).
32 5 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (i94o) § 82-336.
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defined as the power to withhold from making a transaction.5 - It is clear
that the nature of their product being as it is, the fishermen are powerless
in this regard unless some sort of contractual arrangement is made in ad-
vance of the landing of the salmon.8 4 In order to evaluate the effect of
bargaining power in a given market, it is necessary to ascertain the rela-
tive numbers of buyers and sellers in the field. In the Seattle market for
the sale of salmon caught in the open sea there are fewer sellers, inasmuch
as only the captain of the ship offers the fish for sale. There are any num-
ber of buyers, since the distribution of fresh fish is not controlled by a few
large concerns but is done through many smaller dealers and jobbers and
peddlers. Under such conditions, real competition prevails and it cannot
be said that the bargaining power of either group is seriously deficient, al-
though the commodity here is just as perishable as in river fishing. Al-
though the salmon must be sold within forty-eight hours, the individual
buyer has as little power to refuse to buy as the fisherman has to withhold
from making the sale, since if a buyer waits too long or holds out for too
low a price the catch will go to his competitor.
In the river market, however, an entirely different condition is found.
There, hundreds of small fishermen are engaged in supplying only a hand-
ful of large packing concerns.' 5 The plaintiff in the Hinton case, the Co-
lumbia River Packers' Association, accounts for more than sixty per cent
of all the processed fish produced in Oregon alone, as well as a very sub-
stantial amount of the canned fish produced in Washington and Alaska.86
It has two plants in Alaska, a "floating cannery" (the steamship "Men-
non"), and two plants in Washington, in addition to the two large can-
neries in Oregon which are supplied by the defendant fishermen. If any
single fisherman withholds his custom, the packers are not affected one
iota. If any group of fishermen refuse to sell at a given price, the packers
will probably even then be able to fill their needs elsewhere. On the other
hand, the gill-netter is totally dependent on the packers for his compensa-
83 Dunlop & Higgings, "Bargaining Power" and Market Structures, 5o J. Pol. Econ. i
(1942).
84 Perishability of his product has long been considered one of the distinguishing character-
istics of the laborer as opposed to the entrepreneur. "The seller of labor is worse off in several re-
spects than the seller of almost any physical product. His commodity is in the highest degree
perishable. That which is sold today disappears absolutely. If he refuses an offer, the next comer
will probably accept it, and he is likely to be left destitute ..... Under such conditions, the
result of free competition is to throw the advantages of the bargain into the hands of the strong-
er buyer." Final Report of the United States Industrial Commission of 1898, at 8oi (1902).
S5 Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Distribution Methods and Costs, Part IX,
Cost of Production and Distribution of Fish on the Pacific Coast 34 (1946).
86 U.S.D.C. for District of Oregon, Findings of Fact in Columbia River Packers' Ass'n,
Inc. v. Hinton, Finding XXI, Record on Appeal, at 75 (March Term, 1939).
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tion since there is no one else to buy his catch. Separated as he is from the
large city markets for fresh fish, without adequate transportation, he has
no alternative but to sell quickly for what he can get.
It would hardly appear that combination under such circumstances
was the evil at which the Sherman Act was aimed. Nor is its effect such
as to place it within the scope of unreasonable restraint as defined by the
Apex case. The district court in its findings of fact pointed out that "prior
to the organization of the PCFU .... silver-side salmon on occasions
were sold to the packers as low as one cent per pound, and, concurrent
therewith, the retail price of the same product sold to the public in the
same area for between 15 and 20 cents per pound" and that "there
is no evidence offered in this case tending to show that the wholesale
or retail prices paid by consumers have been enhanced by the activities of
these defendants."8 7 As a result of the fishermen's organization, the prod-
uct market has not been appreciably affected, and the only group to be de-
prived of the advantages of competition were the canners, whose profit
per can was perforce reduced.
On the other hand, our analysis of the nature of his product and of his
market would seem to indicate that the Columbia River fisherman is
quite definitely subject to the evils assailed by the exempting Acts. He
catches fish exclusively by his own labor to supply a handful of large can-
neries. He has no effective alternative market and consequently no effec-
tive bargaining power, and is left in a position of complete dependence on
the canners for his livelihood. In this light his combination "to fix the
price of a finished product" becomes instead the familiar union organiza-
tion for purposes of collective bargaining over terms of compensation and
conditions under which services are regularly rendered to the canners.
The lower court admitted in its findings that "it would seem that it is
necessary for those engaged in fishing to arrange, by lawful contractual
relationship, agreements for the sale of the products prior to taking of the
fish ..... "8 81 It also would have permitted the organization of the fisher-
men along certain lines and to a limited degree and with limited purpose
and effect. It gave its blessing to the operation of the defendant as a co-
operative marketing association such as that intended by the Federal
Agricultural Marketing Act19-the kind of organization which was in ef-
s7 Ibid., Finding XXXVIII, at 88.
'
8 Ibid., Finding XXXVII, at 89.
89 "Persons engaged in the fishing industry .... may act together in associations .... in
collectively catching .... processing, handling, and marketing ..... " 15 U.S.C.A. § 521
(1927).
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fect in the Seattle area before the war.9 0 But as we have pointed out, there
are fishermen and fishermen; and what is a fitting mode of organization for
one group with one cluster of trade and craft practices is not appropriate
or adequate for another group with an entirely different industrial pat-
tern. And if the greatly inferior bargaining power of the gill-net salmon
fisherman and his complete dependence on the packers in the river areas
requires him to assume the economic position of the laborer, then in order
for his self-organization to be effective, it must be in the form suited to
laborers-a labor union rather than a cooperative marketing association.
The Pacific Coast Fishermen's Union was chartered in 1932 by the In-
ternational Fishermen and Allied Workers of America of the CIO. By
1939 it had organized the great mass of the fishermen on the Columbia,
Smith, and Umpqua rivers and was recognized by the majority of the
packers as collective bargaining representative for the fishermen. The
packers themselves are combined into an organization known as the Com-
mercial Fisheries Association, which acts as their bargaining agency in
dealing with the union. The union's primary function is to contract with
the packers, in advance of the landing of fish, as to the basic terms and
conditions under which the fishermen will work and the compensation
they will receive for their labors. The constitution and by-laws of the
PCFU require that "members shall not deliver catches outside of union
agreements."'' g And the union requires as a basic condition of every con-
tract with a canner that "the union members shall not be required to work
with and/or alongside non-union employees." 92 It is clear that these two
clauses taken together amount to a union shop, and this is undisputed by
either party. Without some such condition in the contract, the effective-
ness of the union as collective bargaining agent would be seriously jeop-
ardized due to the irregular nature of the supply of fish and the tendency
in days of overabundance to sell and buy outside of union agreements to
the frustration of union action. But the union keeps its charter open and
will admit to membership any bona fide fisherman who agrees to abide by
its charter and withdraw from rival organizations. 93 It must also be point-
9o Even though the Seattle Fish Exchange was organized as a cooperative instead of a un-
ion, and even though it was sanctioned by the above statute, it still came under the indictment
of the antitrust division when its concerted action became really effective; see note 79 supra.
For a discussion of the status of cooperatives in general under the antitrust laws, see The
Federal Antitrust Laws: Recent Application to Cooperative Organizations, 29 Corn. L.Q.
251 (1944).
91 U.S.D.C. for District of Oregon, Findings of Fact in Columbia River Packers' Ass'n,
Inc. v. Hinton, Finding XXXI, Record on Appeal (March Term, 1939).
92 Ibid., Finding XVIII.
93 Ibid., Finding XLVII.
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ed out that there were no independent or unaffiliated fishermen who com-
plained of being deprived of their calling since the union has succeeded in
gaining the support of ioo per cent of the men in the river areas
The particular dispute which brought this case before the court arose
at the start of the 1939 season. The Columbia River Packers' Association
refused to agree to the union-shop provision and withdrew from the Con-
mercial Fisheries Association when the latter signed a collective bargain-
ing agreement which embodied the disputed union-shop clauses. There-
upon the union fishermen withheld their services and the packers brought
this suit for treble damages under the Sherman Act. Thus the large cor-
poration which processes more than 6o per cent of all the fish produced
in Oregon, being confronted with the defensive economic action of the or-
ganized fishermen, invoked the aid of the courts to break the resulting
improved bargaining power of the fishermen so as to be free to use its own
uncontrolled economic force against them. The decree in favor of the
corporation had the effect of enjoining the very persons sought to be pro-
tected by the exempting Acts from engaging in an activity which we have
seen was specifically immunized from Sherman Act liability by the Clay-
ton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. 9 4
B. THE DRAMATISTS' GUILD
Most of the theater-going public think of the playwright as an artist,
an intellect, a talent, a genius, or a "soul." Few people stop to realize that
he too is "economic man," and rarely do they consider the effect of his
market place upon the author and his output. The staging of a play lor a
Broadway run is, nevertheless, a business enterprise and, for the most
part, the business has remained in the hands of a numerically small, but
professionally and economically powerful, group upon whom the under-
taking of a theatrical production depends. The producer or manager is re-
sponsible for the financing, provides the direction, undertakes the risks,
and enjoys what profits are to be made by the enterprise. He chooses the
play as well as those who will act in it. While the actors are generally paid
on a salary basis, the author's compensation usually takes the form of a
certain sum in advance and a percentage of the gross box-office receipts in
the form of royalties. But despite the differences in the wording of their
respective contracts, what the producer is bargaining for in both cases is
the services or workmanship of a given individual. And in both cases the
relationship between the parties is a continuing one.
While the position of the actor is clear on its face, that of the dramatist
is confused by the language which is generally used to describe it. We talk
94 For pertinent sections of the two Acts, see note 71 supra.
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of an author selling his manuscript-not his services-to a producer.
And yet what more does that manuscript represent but the labor of the
author? The term "sale" is also confusing in that it connotes a finality
which is not inherent in the transaction between playwright and manager.
In the everyday bargain and sale over the counter, the seller takes his cash
and the customer his chattel, and neither has any further business with
the other so far as that particular deal is concerned. But the relationship
between the producer and the playwright does not end with the sale of the
script. The author must be on hand at rehearsals for any changes which
the actual staging of the play necessitates. He works with the producer,
director, or manager in revising the play during the rehearsal period, and
it is seldom that the play which greets the audience on opening night is the
same in all respects as the script which was bartered and sold a few months
before.
Not infrequently the normal expectancy of' a Broadway play that has
met with moderate success includes a road tour, a foreign production, a
motion picture adaptation, a novelization, and a condensation for radio
or television use. Each of these possibilities, which are inherent in every
script that is licensed, represents rights and duties for each of the parties,
some of which are contemplated at the time of signing the contract, and
some not anticipated. Prior to the organization of the Dramatists' Guild,
it was common practice in the theatrical market place for the author to
surrender his script and all the rights that it represented for a lump sum
in total compensation. Royalties, when paid, averaged around 5 per
cent, and the manager who first produced the play took to handling and
leasing all subsidiary rights. Managers had unrestricted control over the
manuscript with the absolute right to make any changes which they
deemed necessary whether or not the author gave his consent. Even after
the contract was signed, the playwright had no means of enforcing what-
ever rights it gave him.95 Royalties often were not paid when they fell due,
and as the author could not afford the luxury of litigation,-they continued
to remain unpaid for months at a time.96 As Arthur Garfield Hays put it,
in those days "the individual dramatist bent a deferential head to the
9s The Dramatists' Guild: What It Does, How It Happened, and Why 12 (Pamphlet pub-
lished by the Dramatists' Guild, 1947).
96 Formerly the general practice was for the producer to incorporate each theatrical produc-
tion separately. This often resulted in a situation such that, although back royalties were owing
on one play, the producer could withdraw all his funds from that production, and commence
a new one without the new enterprise being liable for the obligations of the old one.
Today, while the limited partnership is the most common form of organization in the thea-
ter, if a corporation wants to produce a play, the largest stockholder or the person otherwise
in control must undertake with the corporation to assume personal liability for its debts. See
1946 Minimum Basic Agreement, Art. i, § i.
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Shubert fifteen million dollar colossus and gave away his shirt, if he had
one, in order to get a production."97
During this period, both the managers and the actors were organized,
the former into the Managers' Protective Association, 98 the latter into
Actor's Equity, an affiliate of the AFL. The only semblance of collective
action on the part of the authors was the weak and ineffective Dramatists'
Guild of the Author's League of America, which amounted to little more
than a literary club for its fewer than two hundred members. Commenting
on this inadequate state of affairs, George Middleton wrote to the New
York World in 1923: "Until an economic situation arises which forces us
authors into a close organization, we are only a lot of languid lilies with
good intentions; until we have as strong an organization watching only
our interest, as have the actors and managers, we can merely smile sadly
when we are about to be sat on." 99
The repercussions in New York of the rise of the motion picture indus-
try on the West Coast proved to be the economic situation which finally
brought matters to a head. Soon after the practice developed of adapting
Broadway successes for projection on the screen, difficulties arose concern-
ing the disposition of the not insignificant resale and royalty proceeds
from Hollywood. It was held by the courts that any film made from a play
competed with it and that the manager who had contracted for the play,
even though he had not provided for the film rights, was therefore entitled
to protection.Io° This was the origin of what eventually became the estab-
lished practice whereby the managers were regarded as entitled to a half
share in all subsidiary rights. This development in itself caused no great
consternation among the dramatists. The movie revenues at the outset
came as something of a windfall, and the dramatist's elation at this unex-
pected additional return was not too greatly mitigated by having to sacri-
fice half of the interest which was rightfully his.
97 Hays, City Lawyer 132 (1942).
98 This organization has since given way to the League of New York Theaters, which now
represents both managers and theater owners for purposes of collective bargaining. It was with
the managers' committee of this organization that the 1946 Minimum Basic Agreement was
negotiated.
99 New York World (Mar. 27, 1923).
100 See Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 Fed. 6o9 (D.C. N.Y., 1916) and Manners v. Morosco, 252
U.S. 317 (1920), in which cases it was held that even though the license of a play for dramatic
production does not convey the motion picture rights, there is an implied negative covenant by
the author not to use his reserved rights under the copyright to the detriment of the licensee. In
order to obtain a waiver of this objection from the manager, the author had to forfeit half of his
moving picture rights. The movie companies, being unwilling to risk an infringement suit,
tended to withhold purchase of the rights unless title were cleared up beforehand. Hence the
manager could hold up any sale unless he were given his desired share in the proceeds.
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The straw which finally broke the camel's back, however, came in 1925.
Fox Films signed up six managers under a form contract providing for the
sale, by certain key managers of all the motion picture rights in the plays
which they produced, to Fox alone. A secret clause in each of these con-
tracts provided for a weekly salary to be paid by the Hollywood studio to
these affiliated managers in addition to the 5o per cent which they ordi-
narily received. This meant, in effect, that the manager would be getting
more than his 50 per cent and the author would have to sell his play for
anything Fox offered and then receive only half of that. The salary paid to
the manager would undoubtedly reduce the amount which the studio
would pay for the play. "To get his play produced, the author would have
to take it or leave it. As Fox had already tied up six managers, he boasted
that he would practically 'control all of the stage output of those pro-
ducers.' "ox An even greater danger presented by this development was
that as the idea spread to other studios, in the rush to buy up film rights
of the remaining producers, a situation would ultimately result in which
only those plays with film possibilities would receive such backing, and
the development of the legitimate theater would be under the control and
domination of Hollywood. The playwrights rightly feared that the pro-
duction of plays would be undertaken only when they measured up-or
down-to the standards of Hollywood.
Such a prospect proved to be too much for even the hitherto conserva-
tive rank and file of the playwriting profession. Within a year the old
Dramatists' Guild was transformed from a polite learned society into an
active collective bargaining agency for the authors-the form in which it
exists today. Within a year its ranks of some two hundred members had
swelled to nearly a thousand and included not only the most vulnerable,
but also the most venerable, members of the profession. All agreed to
withhbld their plays from the Broadway stage until the managers ac-
cepted the Guild's Minimum Basic Agreement (MBA). After considerable
negotiation, this model contract was drawn up and accepted by the As-
sociation. In essence it amounted to a collective bargaining agreement
specifying minimum compensation and basic terms and conditions under
which a manager could acquire the production rights in an author's play.
Among the items which it covered were minimum down payments and
royalties; minimum share for the author in film rights and the various
subsidiary rights, all rights not then in existence being reserved for the
author;'- a stipulation that no changes were to be made in the script
lox Middleton, These Things Are Mine 314 (i947).
202 This provision in the contract proved to be of great value with the subsequent invention
of sound films.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-EMPLOYEES OR ENTERPRISERS? 66i
without the author's consent; and a provision for compulsory arbitration
of all disputes arising in the course of the enforcement of the Agreement.
Members of the Guild agreed not to show their plays to any manager who
had not signed the agreement, on penalty of a $i,ooo fine and expulsion
from membership. The managers agreed that while the parties would be
free to arrange among themselves for terms over and above those specified
in the MBA, no contracts would be entered into which did not embody at
least the terms set forth therein. They also agreed not to enter into negoti-
ations for plays written by non-Guild members and to abide by the Dram-
atists' Shop. 0 3 These have remained the basic terms and conditions gov-
erning the relations between managers and playwrights up to the present
day, with minor changes in specific provisions such as amounts, percent-
ages, etc., being made from year to year.'0 4
All but one of the 294 members of the Managers' Protective Associa-
tion signed the MBA. Lee Shubert, one of the most powerful managers on
Broadway, fought the Guild to the last. In April 1927 Shubert brought suit
against the Guild, alleging that it was an illegal monopoly operating in re-
straint of trade, using coercion and boycott to compel compliance in vio-
lation of the New York State Anti-trust laws. The arguments presented
by the Shuberts in that case anticipated almost phrase for phrase the lan-
guage of Judge Clark in the Spina case. Inasmuch as the suit was with-
drawn before judgment, there is no official report of the case and the only
information we have to go by is counsel's account of the proceedings:
"They took the position that while 'workers' may join together to bargain
collectively for their services, yet dramatists did not render services, but
sold plays; that the author was a 'factory,' his manuscript was a 'commod-
ity' and the manager was a 'consumer.' Therefore, the applicable law is
that which prohibits monopolization in 'trade and commerce.' "os
The plea at that time met with no success, °0 but the case was not prose-
cuted to judgment. Had there been a reported opinion on the issue it
would have stood the Guild in good stead twenty years later when another
o10 It must be noted that while under the terms of the MBA a manager in good standing
may not deal with a non-Guild author, under its charter the Dramatists' Guild must admit to
membership any dramatist who applies and who agrees to be bound by its constitution and
by-laws. MBA Art. i, § 2. Hence here, as in the fishermen's case, there were no independent
dramatists who complained.
"04 For a summary of the significant provisions of the revised MBA of 1946, which is now in
effect, see op. cit. supra note 95, at 14.
10s Hays, City Lawyer 133 (1942).
X' "Judge Aaron Levy, who heard the argument, has a social conscience. He felt that more
was involved in the case than a point of law. He conferred with the lawyers, and Schubert
signed the minimum basic agreement." Ibid., at 134.
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manager brought an almost identical complaint against the Guild for
treble damages under the Sherman Act.
On May i8, i944, a new musical, "Stovepipe Hat," opened at the
Shubert Theater in New Haven. The book, written by Harold Spina, a
member of the Dramatists' Guild, had been licensed to the producer,
Irving Gaumont, under the terms of. the Minimum Basic Agreement.
Gaumont, needing financial assistance, called upon one Carl Ring, who
invested over $5o,ooo in the show. Due to financial difficulties, Gaumont
assigned his rights in the production to Ring, who continued the show on
his own. Ring was new to the theater, but, in spite of his lack of experience,
took it upon himself to make certain changes in the script to which the
author did not consent and in violation of his contract under the MBA.
The matter was submitted to the Guild, which- took steps to refer it to
arbitration. Ring refused to arbitrate and applied to the district court for
an injunction, alleging irreparable injury under the Sherman Act. Upon
the district court's denial, the case was appealed to the Second Circuit
Court, which granted a temporary injunction restraining arbitration and
sent the case back to the district court for a final hearing on issues of both
fact and law, where it is still pending. The issues of interstate commerce,
pari delicto, and coercion discussed in the court's opinion are not relevant
to our inquiry. The most significant aspect of the case, however, was
treated as a secondary issue both by counsel in the briefsl °7 and by the
court in its summary one-paragraph dismissal of the issue, i.e., the Guild's
status under the exempting Acts.0° Without. any discussion of the under-
lying economic facts of the dramatist's position in the play-producing in-
dustry, and looking only to the formal setting of the transaction, the court
concluded, a priori, that the author was more nearly analogous to "the
fishermen entrepreneurs of the Hinton case" than workingmen banded to-
gether in a union. In all fairness, however, it must be said that no at-
tempt was made by counsel to bring these facts to the court's atten-
tion,'0 9 nor were there any findings of fact in the district court from which
any picture of the industrial pattern could be obtained. It must also be
noted that in his ruling on the motion for rehearing, the judge emphasized
that the court "was making merely preliminary rulings to dispose of the
particular appeal" and pointed out that "final rulings both of fact and
07 Brief of Appellees on Appeal to the 2d Circuit, Point I c., at 26-27; Reply Brief of Ap-
pellants, at 6-7.
zog 148 F. 2d 647, 651-52 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
109 Brief of Appellees on Appeal to the 2d Circuit, Point I c., at 26-27; Reply Brief of Ap-
pellants, at 6-7.
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law must await a definite hearing on the District Court."'I1o Under the cir-
cumstances all that can be said is that it was unfortunate that the court
deemed it proper to make even a merely preliminary ruling on this par-
ticular point without having the necessary background in facts.""
If, however, the district court on remand follows the approach of the
Supreme Court in the Hearst case, it will, in all probability, find that by
virtue of the nature of his product and his market the dramatist's bargain-
ing position makes him subject to the ills at which the exempting Acts
were aimed. Before the advent of the Guild, as has already been shown,
his power to hold back his script was practically nil." 2 In addition to his
generally poor financial position and the imperatives of keeping his family
in three meals a day, which weaken any worker's bargaining power, there is
the additional factor peculiar to the playwright, i.e., that a new play by
an unknown author is absolutely worthless unless it is combined with ac-
tors, scenery, and a stage to bring it before the public. The playwright is
caught in a vicious circle. He cannot get the backing of a manager unless
he has made a name for himself with the public. And he cannot get his
play before the public unless he can get the backing of a manager. To
break into the circle, the young writer has been known to accept any com-
pensation with any conditions, forfeit all rights, and on occasion has even
paid the manager for producing his own play. It was for his benefit that
the Minimum Basic Agreement was drawn up. Those who have already
made their mark can and do command much better terms than the mini-
mum set forth therein. Yet without their cooperation, the minimum stand-
ards under which their less prominent colleagues may be compelled to
work could never have been enforced; for it is only under the threat that
the master craftsmen may withhold their services that a manager can be
110 148 F. 2d 647, 654 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
- The background of the rehearing indicates that the court was willing to consider the in-
dustrial facts, once an attempt was made to present them. Within two weeks after the case was
decided, one of the biggest New York managers brought suit in the New York courts to restrain
arbitration of a dispute under the MBA on grounds that the Ring v. Spina opinion invalidated
it. Application of Shubert, 269 App. Div. ioiS, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 143 (1945). On motion for rehear-
ing, counsel pointed out to the court the disrupting effect its decision was bound to have on the
whole pattern of the industry if allowed to stand: "How many more such applications will be
made between now and the time this case can be tried on the merits .... no one can say. Other
damage could occur on the strength of this court's opinion. Many problems arise during a
play's production which unless settled quickly by arbitration, may leave either party in doubt
as to whether he is acting wrongfully, thus laying himself open to suits for considerable dam-
age." Petition of Appellee on Rehearing, at 15. The court qualified its original holding as above.
148 F. 2d 647, 654 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
I" It must be remembered that the mean subject of our study is not the Pulitzer Prize play-
wright but the multitude of struggling, unknown writers, including the 2,323 associate mem-
bers of the Guild who have not yet seen one of their plays last out on Broadray for three con-
secutive weeks. Op. cit. supra note 95, at 3, 4.
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made to respect the minimum basic rights of a journeyman or apprentice
in the trade.
The name "Dramatists' Guild" rings true in its literal as well as in its
figurative sense. The profession is one of the few which has remained rela-
tively unaffected by the sharp diversification of function into capital and
labor brought about by the industrial revolution and which still maintains
the quality of the old guild system. It is this very ambivalence which
makes for such difficulty when a problem arises which necessitates classi-
fying its members into one or the other group. The dramatist is a literary
craftsman, to be sure, and it is to preserve his integrity as such that he has
been compelled to organize. He himself must be the final arbiter of what
shall appear under his name. The circumstances of the Ring case demon-
strate the great need for protecting the playwright's independence and his
freedom from managerial control and domination over the shape of his
handiwork.
Granted, arguendo, that under the common-law dichotomy he falls into
the, "independent contractor container"; we have seen the futility of using
this outmoded criterion as a guide to present-day economic and social re-
lationships, and the Hearst case has fortunately pointed the way toward
a more realistic approach to the problem. The scope of the employee-em-
ployer relationship as therein reevaluated is broad enough to include inde-
pendent craftsmen, or "independent contractors" when the economic real-
ities of their situation warrants it. The playwright's status as an independ-
ent craftsman is essential not to his personal welfare alone but to the wel-
fate of the art of playwriting in general. It is the pattern of employment
which is best suited to the distinctive pattern of this industry.
The truth of this proposition is borne out chapter and verse by com-
parison with the experience of the playwright in Hollywood. There, as a
general rule, he performs the same function as does the playwright in New
York. But he works on a salary basis, and his workmanship is subject to
the editing, alteration, or even collaboration, of the producer. He is a
perfect employee under the common-law control test."I3 And witness the
result! Writing is an art in which creativity, originality, and imagination
are at a premium. To impose upon the writer an employment pattern
which evolved out of the necessities of the industrial revolution in mass-
production industries, judging by its results, has the effect of conditioning
a stereotyped, mass-production type of writing. The effect of the circuit
1In the Matter of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, and Motion Picture Producers Ass'n
and Screen Writers' Guild, Inc., 7 N.L.R.B. 662, 686-go (1938).
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court's holding, if followed on remand, is to superimpose an arbitrary form
which the court itself has determined to be "the" employee-employer rela-
tionship as the price of the statutory protection to which, as we have
shown, the dramatists are in any event rightfully entitled by virtue of
their underlying economic position. To impose such a form, which, as
Hollywood's unfortunate example demonstrates, is basically unsuited to
the peculiar quality of their craft, is to stifle the development of that craft
itself as well as of the craftsman and his workmanship.
THE LEGAL PENDULUM
And consequently the legal pendulum, for purposes of applying the statute, may
swing one way or the other, depending upon the weight of this balance and its relation
to the special purpose at hand.114
The significance of the two cases transcends the fate of the Oregon
fishermen or the New York playwrights under the anti-trust laws. The
cases must be regarded as a commentary and a caveat on the judicial
process. They are but two recent examples of the inapplicability of legal
concepts to determine economic facts.
We have shown that had the court in each case approached the prob-
lem at hand along the lines employed in the Hearst case, quite another
conclusion would have probably been reached. For, as our studies of the
fishermen and the playwrights, each within its respective industrial con-
text, indicate, they are in fact subject to the abuses which Congress sought
to remedy in the exempting acts; and the structure of the litigation in
both cases in itself is real evidence of the need of these groups for the pro-
tection which the acts afford.
But to say that the two exclusionary decisions antedate that of the
Hearst case, that therefore the latter indicates a change of heart on the
part of the Court, and that were they to be reheard today, the courts
would be bound to follow the latter approach and so arrive at a more ap-
propriate judgment, would seem to overlook a basic aspect of the problem.
For indeed it was substantially the same court which decided the Hinton
case as decided the Hearst case. To be sure, Justice Rutledge, who wrote
the opinion in the latter, was not on the Court when the former case was
written. But it is doubtful that this single infusion of new blood into the
Court would account for the complete metamorphosis in the decisions of
the seven remaining members.Y5 Nor have there been any intervening
X"4 NLRE v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 1ii, 126 (1944).
us Justices Douglas and Roberts did not sit in the Hinton case; the remaining seven justices
joined unanimously in the majority opinion written by Justice Black. Justice Roberts dissent-
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cases which have set forth any landmarks which create a precedent for, or
mark the transition to, a complete about-face in judicial technique.
Part of the explanation may well lie in the simple fact that in the Hin-
ton case the problem was not presented in so sharp an outline as in the
Hearst decision, so that the Court was not moved to reappraise its funda-
mental assumptions and tended rather to rely more or less unquestioningly
on the vestigial remnants of an earlier climate of judicial opinion. But
there was another element of the Hearst case which was lacking in the
former decision: it came to the Court on appeal from a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board, whereas the earlier case was, from its
initial stages, the sole product of the judicial process; and that factor ad-
mittedly played a major role in the decision. It is one thing to hold that
the determination of employment relationship cannot be made on the
basis of any preconceived universal norm and that each must be decided
individually as a function of the particular industrial pattern of which it is
part. It is quite another matter for a court conscientiously and success-
fully to apply this method through the use of only the usual judicial tech-
niques which are at its disposal.
Although we would not go so far as to say that an administrative in-
vestigation and finding on the facts is indispensable to the mischief-rem-
edy approach, or that an accurate factual analysis cannot be made by a
court without it, still a comparison of the cases discussed in this comment
would seem to indicate that the administrative processing of the under-
lying framework within which the case is set is undoubtedly of great as-
sistance to a court in these matters of classification and does increase the
chances that its decision will be in keeping with what the economic realities
demand. We do not mean to imply that a preliminary hearing by an ad-
ministrative board will ipso facto insure a justifiable finding and decree.
We merely wish to point out that by its very nature, the administrative
agency is at a substantial advantage over the usual judicial fact-finding
agencies., 6 For it must be admitted that these are matters of a highly spe-
cialized sort, generally beyond the special competence of the "reasonable"
district judge, whose own empirical knowledge tells him nothing about
ed in the Hearst case and Justice Reed concurred; the remaining seven justices joined in the
Rutledge opinion.
116 Compare the following excerpt from the Final Report of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure (x941), p. ig: "Because the members of an agency or of its
staff-like persons of similar experience in private affairs-approach the problem with a con-
siderable background of knowledge and experience and with the equipment for investigation,
they can accomplish much of the work without the necessity of informing themselves by the
testimonial process."
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such esoteric judicial material as gill-net fishing on the Umpqua River or
playwriting for the New York theater, and whose daily docket of torts,
trusts, and contingent remainders can hardly be said to provide any added
qualifications for making such a specialized economic determination. The
court is generally dependent on what counsel tells it for its knowledge of
the fact situation. If counsel does not present an adequate picture of the
industry under consideration, the court decides the case on the incomplete
picture before it, and you have the result of the Spina case. The appoint-
ment of a referee or special master is obviously an aid, but here too the
method is costly, inefficient, and of questionable accuracy." 7
Whether this means, as some have suggested,"8 that a special agency
should be created to handle the problems of labor groups under the admin-
istration of the anti-trust laws, is beyond the scope of this comment. On
its face, it is doubtful whether the advantages to be derived from such a
suggestion as it bears on this particular problem alone would, in either
quantitative or qualitative terms, be sufficient to justify our embarking
on such a project. Whether it is feasible to refer such determinations to
some existing agency such as the NLRB, for example, is likewise outside
our province.
And so, at the conclusion of this study, a basic question remains un-
resolved: Can" the reasonable court," unaided by an administrative proc-
essing of the sort which formed the base for the Court's opinion in the
Hearst case, successfully apply the mischief-remedy approach therein set
forth with its exacting demands upon the fact-finding mechanisms of our
present court system? The question, to be sure, is incapable of any con-
clusive answer at this writing and will only be decided by future experi-
ence. One thing is dear, however, from our investigation: the former con-
ceptualist approach of the Hinton and the Spina cases, while providing a
ready-mix formula of quick and easy judicial application, makes no sense
in terms of the economic realities involved, and in terms of results has
served only to frustrate the legislative policy of the exempting Acts. On
the other hand, we have seen that the approach of the Hearst case, when
conscientiously applied, does allow for a more fitting treatment of these
perplexing borderline cases. True, it is of great help to a court in applying
1X7 The appointment of a new referee in each case who must in each instance start from
scratch would seem to be a vastly inferior method to that of the board which specializes in such
problems and brings its knowledge acquired in the handling of one case to bear on its deter-
nination of the next.
118 Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson Case, 36 Ill. L. Rev. i
(1941).
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it to have an administrative hearing to start with. But it cannot be said
that the judiciary, aided by counsel, is incapable of handling it alone; it
has yet to try. Granted, the Hearst test makes greater demands on the re-
sources of the judicial process than did the traditional no~a. But it is a
far more fruitful endeavor to tax the resources of the court to meet the
demands of a more exacting judicial method than to compromise the qual-
ity of our law to meet the limitations of the men who administer it.
